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Here, I will review the most widely held account of phantom sensations and the effects of deafferentation 
in the somatosensory cortex, namely, the “re-mapping hypothesis.” According to the re-mapping hypothesis, 
deafferentation is followed by significant neural reorganization that eliminates the neural structures that give 
rise to phantom sensations, restoring the alignment between the brain’s representation of the body and the 
actual condition of the body. Implicit in the re-mapping hypothesis is the view that the brain’s primary function 
is the accurate representation of the body. In response to the remapping hypothesis, I propose an alternative 
theory, which I have dubbed the “preservation hypothesis.” The preservation hypothesis argues that the primary 
function of the brain is to preserve the entirety of the brain’s structures and functional capacities. Thus, upon 
deafferentation, the brain does not eliminate phantom sensations and restore an accurate representation of 
the body but takes steps to preserve the neural structures underlying phantom sensations, with the effect 
of maintaining phantom sensations long term. While the effects of deafferentation are certainly an empirical 
matter, assessing our views on the subject discloses our deeply held assumptions regarding the primary function 
of the brain: does the brain operate such that it will do all that it can to represent the body accurately? Does 
the brain have certain limitations in its accurate representation of the body? Or, does the brain care nothing for 
reality and the accurate representation of the body, operating with the sole purpose of preserving its structure 
and functional capacities in their entirety? I hope to make some progress in answering these questions.
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Whenever I tell someone that I am researching phantom limbs,1 I often get the same 
question in response, “why doesn’t the brain know that the limb is no longer there?” 
While the question may be posed by a novice, implicit in the question is a sophisticated 
understanding of the function of the brain. To ask, “why doesn’t the brain know that the 
limb is no longer there,” implies that the brain’s production of an experience of the body 
that does not align with the actual condition of the body constitutes a failing on the 
part of the brain. Interestingly, it is not just laymen who hold this view; neuroscientists 
1. The phantom limb, the lingering feeling that one’s amputated limb is still present, is a condition 
experienced by 98% of amputees, 60-80% of whom experience some degree of pain associated with the 
phantom (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998; Sherman et al. 1984). 
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also inquire, “what happens in the brain upon deafferentation?”2 That is, does anything 
happen in the brain after amputation that might correct the subsequent discordance 
between the experience and actual condition of the body?
In what follows, I will critically evaluate both current explanations for phantom 
sensations and the conceptions of the brain to which these explanations are implicitly 
committed. I will begin with a review of the most widely-held account of phantom 
sensations, the “re-mapping hypothesis.” Implicit in the re-mapping hypothesis is the 
belief that the mechanics of the brain work to represent the body accurately, and, 
upon amputation, significant neural reorganization is initiated to eliminate the causes 
of phantom sensations and restore the alignment between experience and actual 
condition of the body. I will assess this hypothesis, raising issues with it, and ultimately 
proposing an alternative account, which I have dubbed the “preservation hypothesis.” 
The preservation hypothesis posits that the brain does not attempt to eliminate phantom 
sensations and accurately represent the body but takes steps to preserve the neural 
structures underlying phantom sensations, with the effect of the long-term maintenance 
of phantom sensations. 
While the causes of phantom sensations and the effects of deafferentation are 
certainly empirical matters, assessing our views on the subject discloses our deeply held 
assumptions regarding the ultimate function of the brain: does the brain operate such 
that it will do all that it can to represent the body accurately? Does the brain have certain 
functional limitations in the accurate representation of the body? Or, does the brain care 
nothing for reality and the accurate representation of the body, operating with the sole 
purpose of preserving its structures and functional capacities in their entirety? In this 
essay, I hope to approach answers to these questions. 
I. The Initial Appearance of Phantom Sensations
With the aid of modern science, the initial appearance of phantom sensations is well 
understood. In the parietal lobe, exists an area of the brain called the somatosensory 
cortex (the primary sensory cortex), which is responsible for mapping sensations of the 
most peripheral parts of our body (i.e., the sensations of the skin, joints, and muscles). 
Whenever we touch something, or something touches a part of our body, afferent signals 
via the peripheral nervous system are sent to the part of the somatosensory cortex that 
corresponds with that limb, those afferent signals are mapped and we experience a 
2. Deafferentation is a disruption of afferent neural connections between the peripheral body and brain. In 
this piece, I will be considering deafferentation that results from the amputation of a limb.
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sensation in the limb. If the nerves connecting a body part to the brain were disconnected 
or destroyed, or if a body part were amputated (i.e., deafferented), the part of the 
somatosensory cortex representing that part of the brain would continue to exist, at least 
for a time, despite not receiving any direct afferent signals from the body. Additionally, 
the deafferented cortical area continues to receive efferent signals from the motor cortex, 
signals concerning executive movements of the body. The continued existence of a 
deafferented cortex’s neural structure, in conjunction with its continued stimulation by 
efferent signals from the motor cortex gives rise to phantom sensations and explains the 
initial appearance of the phantom limb. The arrival of efferent signals from the motor 
cortex also explains why so many amputees claim that they can move their phantom.3 
Many mysteries continue to surround phantom sensations, and one of these 
mysteries proves almost as unusual as the case of the phantom limb itself. In 1991, Pons 
et al. made an incredible discovery while recording neuronal activity in the primary 
somatosensory cortex of four adult macaque monkeys. The macaques “had received 
deafferentations of an upper limb, three unilateral and one bilateral,” by way of dorsal 
rhizotomy, “more than 12 years before the recording session” (Pons et al, 1857).4 Pons 
noticed that when the faces of his monkey subjects were touched, the effect in the brain 
was such that the corresponding face area of the somatosensory cortex was activated 
(which was expected), but so was the area that represented the deafferented limb (Pons 
et al. 1991). Touching the ipsilateral face of a monkey with unilateral arm deafferentation 
excites the area of the somatosensory cortex that represents the face as well as the area 
that represents the arm. According to Pons et al. “[V]irtually identical findings were 
obtained in the three other animals,” and just “a slight deflection of facial hairs was 
sufficient to obtain a vigorous neuronal response” in the deafferented zone (Ibid, 1859).
Prior to Pons’ discovery, all attempts at researching phantom sensations faced the 
seemingly insurmountable obstacle of determining how to research a phenomenon 
3. Studies by Lotze et al. 1999, Raffin, E. et al. 2012, and Makin et al. 2013 highlight amputees’ motor control 
over their phantom limbs, many of whom can execute fine motor skills even 53 years after amputation. 
Motor skills executed by amputees include, but are not limited to, (1) elbow flexion/extension (for above-
elbow amputees only); (2) wrist flexion/extension; (3) hand closing/ opening; (4) thumb to index 
opposition; (5) finger abduction/ adduction (Raffin, E. et al. 2012, 748).
4. Pons’ study on the “Silver Spring monkeys” was the focus of one of the most public animal abuse cases in 
the history of the United States, and was the very first animal research case to reach the Supreme Court. 
Since Pons, phantom limb research has overwhelmingly utilized non-invasive and humane procedures on 
human patients. This change is in part due to the pioneering work and nuanced approaches to the study of 
phantom sensations by V.S. Ramachandran.
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that had no physical correlate on the peripheral body. Pons et al.’s discovery (that the 
stimulation of intact body parts can excite a deafferented area in the somatosensory 
cortex) opened the possibility of studying phantom sensations through intact limbs 
albeit not the limb that corresponds to the phantom sensation. The discovery also raised 
a multitude of questions that researchers, thanks to Pons et al., now had a means of 
empirically investigating. For instance, what was being observed in the co-activation of 
the face and hand cortices when the ipsilateral face of a monkey with unilateral hand 
deafferentation was stimulated? Additionally, what were the perceptual correlates of this 
experiment, that is, what were the monkeys feeling when their faces were touched? 
Unfortunately, Pons could not ask the monkeys what they felt when their faces were 
touched, but, the following year, V.S. Ramachandran conducted an experiment with 
human unilateral hand amputees in which he could ask his patients what they felt when 
their faces were stimulated. Results showed that the perceptual correlates of this cortical 
co-activation are the simultaneous experience of sensations on the face and phantom 
hand (Ramachandran et al. 1992). These sensations are: (1) modality specific (i.e., if cold 
water is dripped on the face, then the patient will feel cold water being dripped on the 
phantom hand); and, (2) topographically organized (i.e., a point-by-point map of the 
surface of the hand appears on the face) (Ramachandran et al. 1992). Ramachandran’s 
MEG scans of the somatosensory cortex confirm Pons et al.’s findings ; when the 
ipsilateral face area of the somatosensory cortex is stimulated, both the face area and 
large sections of the deafferented hand area are simultaneously stimulated in the brain. 
But what could explain the cortical co-activation that both Pons and Ramachandran 
were observing? As a first step in explaining this phenomenon, Ramachandran notes 
that the face area neighbors the hand area in the somatosensory cortex. And while 
the proximity of these two areas does not fully explain observed neural activity nor its 
perceptual correlates, it offers some insight into why touching the ipsilateral face of a 
unilateral hand amputee could simultaneously produce sensations in the face and the 
phantom hand. Unilateral hand amputees can also experience sensations in their phantom 
limbs when the arm area most proximal to the amputation line is stimulated, which is an 
area that also neighbors the hand area in the somatosensory cortex (Ramachandran et al. 
1992). Additionally, stimulation of the contralateral intact hand also elicits sensations in 
the deafferented hand area; here we are observing “cross-callosal” connections as opposed 
to intra-hemispheric connections between neighboring areas of the somatosensory cortex 
(Giummarra et al. 2007). 
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II. The Remapping Hypothesis
As an explanation of the co-activation of intact and deafferented sensory areas, 
Ramachandran formulates the “Remapping Hypothesis,” which remains to this day 
the most widely accepted account of cortical co-activation. The remapping hypothesis 
proposes the following:
1. Upon deafferentation, a cortical area becomes vacant or empty, for 
no direct sensory input is arriving to this part of the brain from the 
peripheral body.
2. Neighboring cortical areas sense the vacancy in the deafferented 
cortex, and actively invade with the effect of reorganizing the 
deafferented cortical area such that its structure and functional 
capacities become continuous with the intact cortical area.
As for the mechanism that facilitates this cortical reorganization, Ramachandran 
offers the following two possibilities: 
1. The invasion of a deafferented cortical area occurs when a 
neighboring cortical area “sprouts thousands of neural tendrils that 
creep over into” the deafferented area (Ramachandran 2011, 28).
2. Preexisting neural connections exist between neighboring cortical 
areas, which are “masked” or “inhibited” under normal conditions 
(i.e., when a cortex is receiving afferent signals from the peripheral 
body) (Ramachandran et al. 1992, 1160; Ramachandran 2011, 28). 
Upon deafferentation, a cortical area is no longer able to inhibit 
signals from these pre-existing neural connections, resulting in an 
invasion of afferent signals from neighboring cortical areas.5 
5. Ramachandran explains, “Thus even in healthy normal adult brains there might be sensory inputs from the 
face to the brain’s face map and to the hand map area as well. If so, we must assume that this occult or 
hidden input is ordinarily inhibited by the sensory fibers arriving from the real hand. But when the hand 
is removed, this silent input originating from the skin on the face is unmasked and allowed to express 




Considering that phantom sensations can develop quite quickly post-amputation,6 
Ramachandran suggests that the initial work of cortical reorganization is most likely “a 
result of the unmasking of ‘silent’ synapses, rather than of anatomical changes, such 
as ‘sprouting’” (Ramachandran et al. 1992, 1160). However, the two mechanisms of 
cortical reorganization are not mutually exclusive. Ramachandran explains that there is 
presently “no way…of easily distinguishing between these two theories, although my 
hunch is that both mechanisms are at work.” (Ramachandran 1998, 35). Thus, cortical 
reorganization could very well be initiated by the unmasking of pre-existing synaptic 
connections, while the long-term process of reorganization involves the sprouting of new 
neural connections. 
Ramachandran also surmises that this process is evolutionarily “beneficial to the 
organism” (Ramachandran 2000, 319). For one, the process restores the alignment 
between the experience of the body and the actual condition of the body by eliminating 
the neural structures that give rise to phantom sensations. Ramachandran views the 
restoration of the alignment between experience and the condition of the body as 
the mechanism’s primary function. In addition to restoring the discordance between 
experience and actual condition of the body, cortical reorganization prevents cortical 
degeneration. Without sufficient afferent stimulation, a cortical area would degenerate 
and ultimately become a rotted-out bit of brain. The neural mechanism at work post-
deafferentation prevents this degeneration; an intact cortical area appropriates a 
deafferented area and includes it in its own representational activities, guaranteeing 
continued afferent stimulation and thus preventing neural degeneration in the 
somatosensory cortex (Ramachandran 2000, 319). 
Following the appropriation of a deafferented cortex by an intact cortex, 
Ramachandran suggests that we can reasonably anticipate an increase in that intact 
cortex’s representational and functional powers (Ramachandran 2000, 319). An intact 
cortex would come to possess a greater area of representation in the somatosensory 
cortex, and there ought to be measurable and perceptual correlates to this change. 
Specifically, Ramachandran anticipates “tactile hyperacuity” both in the area most 
proximal to the amputation line and in any body parts whose area of correspondence in 
the brain neighbors the deafferented area. 
6. Patients can experience vivid phantom sensations immediately following the amputation of a limb, such 
that “[S]ome patients wake up from anesthesia and are incredulous when told that their arm had to be 
sacrificed, because they still vividly feel its presence” (Ramachandran 1998, 22). 
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Beyond its ability to explain cortical co-activation, the remapping hypothesis proves 
fascinating, insofar as it implicitly contains a vision for the primary function, the telos, 
of the brain. According to Ramachandran, deafferentation initiates a mechanism in the 
somatosensory cortex by which intact cortical areas invade and reorganize a deafferented 
cortex with the effect that the deafferented cortex is completely appropriated into intact 
areas. The perceptual effect of this mechanism is that phantom sensations, over time, 
decrease in their vividness and eventual vanish completely, restoring the alignment 
between one’s experience of the body and the actual condition of the body. And 
if this mechanism is indicative of an overall function of the brain, then it seems clear 
that the brain’s utmost concern is producing an accurate representation of the body. 
Should something challenge the brain’s ability to accurately represent the body, such as 
deafferentation, the brain initiates a mechanism by which it corrects the discrepancy. In 
the case of phantom sensations, the brain must literally destroy a part of its structure and 
functional capacities in order to represent the body as it actually is. 
The principle question asked by neuroscientists with respect to phantom sensations 
is, “what are the effects of deafferentation in the brain” (i.e., what happens in the brain 
after a limb is amputated?). This question proves to be no more than a sophisticated form 
of the same question posed by non-experts on learning of phantom sensations, which is, 
“why doesn’t the brain know that the limb is no longer there?” The intuitions of experts 
and laypeople are aligned when it comes to phantom sensations; any condition in which 
the experience of the body is in obvious discord with the actual condition of the body is 
an intolerable one. Either the brain must do something to correct this condition or the 
brain has hit a functional limit in its ability to accurately represent the body. With respect 
to phantom sensations, the remapping hypothesis takes the position that the brain can 
come to know that the limb is no longer present, and initiates a mechanism of neural 
reorganization to eliminate the neural structures that give rise to phantom sensations, 
restoring the alignment between the experience and condition of the body. Guiding this 
hypothesis, and the question posed by experts and laypeople alike, is the intuition that 
the primary function of the brain is to accurately represent the condition of the body. If 
the brain fails to accurately represent the body, as in the case of phantom sensations, then 
the brain must do something to correct the situation or the error signals an instance in 
which the brain has been stumped (i.e., has hit a functional limit in its ability to accurately 
represent the body). Regardless of what view is taken, both views are equally guided by 
the assumption that brain’s primary function is the accurate representation of the body. 
Any discordance that arises between the experience and actual condition of the body 
must be corrected or constitutes a failure of the brain. 
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III. A Cartesian Interlude
Nearly 400 years ago, another novel scientist took up the challenge of explaining 
phantom sensations. This scientist determined that sensations must be occurring in the 
brain, not the body, and that the continued existence of structures in the brain that 
directly correspond to the peripheral body support the emergence of phantom sensations; 
“each tiny tube on the inside surface of the brain corresponds to a bodily part” and “each 
point on the surface of gland H [the pineal gland] corresponds to a direction in which 
these parts can be turned” (Descartes The World, 154). And just as Ramachandran’s 
explanation of phantom sensations contains within it a vision of the primary function of 
the brain, this scientist also understood phantom sensations as offering insight into the 
function of the brain, a window into the teleology of mind. His name: Descartes. 
Phantom sensations are often viewed as the exclusive domain of contemporary 
science, and while some researchers have explored the field’s early modern origins,7 
most insights remain in the annals of history, failing to transcend into the contemporary 
scientific discussion. Here, I would like to indulge in an experiment. I will review 
Descartes’ treatment of phantom sensations, not as a documentation of the past, but as 
inspiration for assessing the state of phantom limb research as it stands today. 
In Meditation 6 of Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes explains the 
phenomenon of phantom sensations as follows,
…many experiences gradually weakened any faith that I had in the 
senses…And not just the external senses, but the internal senses as 
well. For what could be more intimate than pain? But I had heard it 
said by people whose leg or arm had been amputated that it seemed to 
them that they still occasionally sensed pain in the very limb they had 
lost. Thus, even in my own case it did not seem to be entirely certain 
that some bodily member was causing me pain, even though I did 
sense pain in it (Descartes Meditations, 95).8
7. Finger and Hustwit offer an extensive account of the historical development of phantom limb research in 
their article “Five Early Accounts of Phantom Limb in Context: Pare, Descartes, Lemos, Bell, and Mitchell” 
(Finger and Hustwit 2003).
8. In addition to Meditation 6 of the Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes discusses phantom sensations 
on at least two other occasions; in a private letter to Fromondus (1637) and in Part IV Article 196 of 
Principles of Philosophy (1644).
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Phantom sensations are treated by Descartes on two different levels of 
understanding. The first level, the common-sense level of understanding, treats phantom 
sensations with respect to how they initially strike us as a failing of the body/brain. 
Phantom sensations lead one to doubt the reliability of the senses, because, in losing a 
limb, the senses fail to represent the condition of the body accurately. Phantom sensations 
are to feel what is not there and to know that which is false. This common-sense level of 
understanding understands phantom sensations themselves to be the error committed by 
the body/brain, an error in the accurate representation of the body.
The second level, the higher level of understanding, emerges from further reflection 
on the exact nature of the error to which phantom sensations alert us. As Descartes 
notes, phantom sensations raise the possibility that “even in my own case it did not seem 
to be entirely certain that some bodily member was causing me pain, even though I did 
sense pain there” (Ibid). Phantom sensations led Descartes to reconsider the location in 
the body/brain at which sensations are produced. Sensations are experienced as occurring 
in the body, but if sensations continue to be perceived in a limb even after that limb has 
been destroyed, then clearly the limb itself cannot be the locus of sensation. And if all 
sensations are experienced as occurring in the body, despite not actually occurring in the 
body, then the nature of sensations generally would be deceptive. 
Descartes ultimately determines that sensations occur not in the body, but in the 
brain. Descartes explains, 
when nerves in the foot are agitated in a violent and unusual manner, 
this motion of theirs extends through the marrow of the spine to the 
inner reaches of the brain, where it gives the mind the sign to sense 
something, namely, the pain as if it is occurring in the foot (Ibid, 102). 
Movements in the peripheral body travel up into the interior of the brain via nerves and 
the “marrow of the spine,” but it is the movement in the brain that “gives the mind the 
sign to sense something.” And there seems nothing inherently strange about sensations 
occurring in an organism’s brain as opposed to its body. 
It is unnerving, however, that the sensations the brain produces are experienced as 
occurring in the body as opposed to being experienced in their true location of occurrence 
in the brain. As Descartes notes, 
…the nature of man could have been so constituted by God that this 
same motion in the brain might have indicated something else to the 
mind: for example, either the motion itself as it occurs in the brain, or 
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in the foot, or in some place in between, or something entirely different 
(Ibid).
The mechanics of the brain need not have been organized such that the production of 
sensation be experienced by an agent as occurring in that agent’s body. Sensation could 
have been experienced, Descartes posits, as: (1) directly occurring in the brain; (2) as the 
actual motions in the body (i.e., violent agitation, as opposed to the feeling of pain); (3) 
as traveling through the nerves or up the spinal cord; or, (4) something entirely different. 
All these alternative possibilities posit ways in which sensations could have provided 
objective insights into the nature of sensation and its actual process of production. 
However, sensation, as it is, communicates something false about the nature of sensation; 
sensation is produced in the brain but is deceptively experienced as occurring in the 
peripheral body. 
At a higher level of understanding, we see that phantom sensations do not 
independently constitute an error of sensation; rather, they alert us to an error that 
concerns the status of all our sensations. Sensations generally, insofar as they occur in 
the brain but are experienced in the body, fail to accurately communicate to us the actual 
happenings of the body. And this illusion, that sensations occur in the body when they 
in fact occur in the brain, is a direct product of the mechanics of the brain. We are no 
longer dealing with an error, but a failing, an infirmity of the brain itself. It was assumed 
that the brain’s job is to accurately represent the body and the external world, but we 
find that the mechanics of the brain produce sensations that are deceptive with respect 
to sensation’s actual nature and its true location of production. Sensation, as a potential 
mechanism for discerning the objective properties of the external world, is corrupt at its 
core.
Speaking for myself, I am rather grateful to my brain for failing to represent 
sensation as occurring at its true location of inception, and I cannot begin to imagine 
what it would be like to experience all the sensations we associate with our bodies as 
being experienced in the brain. For those of you who also intuitively grasp the benefit 
of experiencing sensations as occurring in our extended body, one may begin to see how 
Descartes has rather cheekily demonstrated that neither sensation nor, consequently, the 
mechanics of the brain are particularly interested in accurately representing the body 
and the happenings of the body. While the nature of man could have certainly been 
constituted differently, “nothing else would have served so well the maintenance of the 
body” than its present arrangement (Ibid). Thereby, for Descartes, the brain’s disinterest 
in representing the body accurately is to our benefit; it is far better for our preservation 
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that we experience ourselves as a unified embodied being, and not as a being within a 
being (i.e., a smaller organism operating out of the head of a larger organism). 
In reviewing the nature of sensation, Descartes uncovers two critical insights. Firstly, 
the nature of sensation as inherently deceptive provides grounds by which Descartes can 
reject his previously held assumption that the function of the body/brain is the accurate 
representation of the body. Secondly, Descartes recognizes that, although sensations 
are deceptive, their nature is such that “nothing else would have served so well the 
maintenance of the body” (Ibid, 102). Thereby, the true function of the body/brain, that 
which all the activities of the body/brain are directed towards, must be “the welfare of 
the body” (Ibid, 103). 
There is one last hurdle Descartes must overcome in positing this new function 
for the body/brain; phantom sensations themselves. It is quite possible that phantom 
sensations constitute a moment in which the mechanics of the brain have failed to secure 
what is necessary to preserve the body/brain. It is to our benefit that the mechanics 
of the brain produce the experience of sensation as occurring in our body, but it is a 
burden that these same mechanics maintain the experience of a limb even after that 
limb has been destroyed. According to Descartes, “the nature of man…cannot help 
being sometimes mistaken,” but “I know that all the senses set forth what is true more 
frequently than what is false regarding what concerns the welfare of the body” (Ibid, 
102–3). While Descartes does not muse much over how phantom sensations could 
themselves be beneficial to the organism, he does believe that, regardless of whether 
phantom sensations are a benefit or a burden, the burden is absolutely worth the benefit.9 
That is: (1) to experience sensations as occurring in the body as opposed to in the brain; 
and, (2) to have the structural and functional capacities of the body enshrined in the 
brain such that sensations of the body arise in the brain, is far more beneficial for the 
welfare of the human than the burden posed by phantom sensations. 
The burden, phantom sensations, does offer a conciliation prize, for a reflection 
upon phantom sensations aid us in further fleshing out the primary function of the brain 
and mind; the maintenance or preservation of the organism (Ibid 102-3). According to 
Descartes, “I can think of no better arrangement” than the current mechanics of the 
9. Giummarra et al. argue that the preservation, and not the reorganization, of a deafferented cortex is 
necessary for the well-being of the individual. For instance, the successful operation of a prosthesis depends 
upon that prosthesis having a “neural template” in the somatosensory cortex. Without the preservation of 
a deafferented cortex, it would be impossible for a patient to operate or even recognize a prosthesis as an 
extension of his or her body (Giummarra et al. 2007, 223). 
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brain and the kind of sensations that it produces, for the sensation that it does produce, 
“of all the ones it is able to produce, is most especially and most often conducive to the 
maintenance of a healthy man” (Ibid, 102). Descartes is unequivocal in “Meditation 6” 
that the aim of brain mechanics is to produce a condition that best enables the human 
to maintain its health and preserve itself. And phantom sensations demonstrate a 
facet of the brain’s function. Specifically, phantom sensations show us that the effort 
to preserve extends to the brain itself, where the brain preserves its structure and 
functional capacities even if a part of the body is destroyed. And the fact that the brain 
maintains its structure and functional capacities in spite of the actual condition of the 
body, demonstrates to Descartes that the function of preservation is not aligned with the 
function of accurate representation of the body and external world. The true function, or 
telos, of the mechanics of the brain is the maintenance and preservation of the entirety 
of the organism.10 
At a common-sense level of understanding, phantom sensations themselves 
represent a failing of the brain to produce an experience of the body that accurately 
represents the body’s present condition. At a higher level of understanding, we see that 
this failing is no failing at all, but an indication that our initial conception of the function 
of the brain is false. The function of the brain is the preservation of the organism’s 
structure and functional capacities, and this function involves an indifference to the 
accurate representation of the condition of the body and the objective nature of the 
external world. Sensations are experienced as occurring in the body, despite originating 
in the mind, because this kind of sensation is most beneficial to the maintenance of the 
human organism. And while phantom sensations may be a burden to an amputee, the 
brain’s preservation of its ability to represent the structure and functional capacities of 
a limb, even after that limb has been destroyed, offers a privileged glimpse into what 
follows from the brain’s fulfilling its function of maintenance and preservation. 
Returning to our contemporary study of phantom sensations, we see that 
Ramachandran certainly appreciates the common-sense understanding of phantom 
sensations, but perhaps has not grasped the higher sense understanding. Ramachandran 
recognizes that the phenomenon of phantom sensations constitutes a disconnect between 
our experience of the body and the actual condition of the body, but simultaneously 
maintains that the brain has a mechanism by which it can correct this disconnect and 
10. In his book Cartesian Metaphysics and the Whole Nature of Man, Richard Hassing reiterates the point that 
“Descartes makes clear that the soul-body composite has a natural teleology: its natural end is the health 
and conservation on the body” (Hassing 2015, 57).
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realign our experience of the body with the body’s physical condition. By way of this 
mechanism, the brain can fulfill its function of accurately representing the body. 
Ramachandran’s diagnosis and suggested remedy of the problem, however, fails to 
recognize that the original sin is not phantom sensations themselves, but that sensations 
generally are deceptive; sensations occur in the brain but are experienced as occurring 
in the body. While this phenomenal aspect of sensations might be incredibly beneficial 
to the organism, it contradicts our account of the brain as working toward providing an 
accurate representation of our body and the external world. The brain does not only just 
fail to accurately represent the condition of the body post-amputation but it also fails to 
do so with respect to all sensations. 
The illusion that Ramachandran simultaneously falls prey to and maintains is that 
there ever was a point in time at which the mechanism of the brain produced sensations 
that accurately communicated the condition of the body. Sensations, at their core, are 
deceptive, insofar as they do not accurately communicate the process of their production 
and the location of their inception, and thus have never satisfied the function of 
accurately representing the condition of the body. And, if that is the case, then it would 
be odd that, following deafferentation and the emergence of phantom sensations, the 
brain would suddenly take up an interest with the accurate representation of the body 
and initiate a rather dramatic process of neural reorganization such that the experience of 
the body is realigned with the actual condition of the body. 
IV. The Preservation Hypothesis
The intuition that overwhelmingly guides the remapping hypothesis is that the 
primary function of the brain is the accurate representation of the body. Descartes, 
however, makes a persuasive case that sensations have never constituted an accurate 
representation of the body, and, therefore, it would be misguided to interpret neural 
changes following deafferentation as indicative of a restoration of accurate representation. 
How can something that never was be restored? This suggests that the remapping 
hypothesis could be correct in its observations of phantom sensations, but misguided 
in its assessment of the significance of these observations. Descartes’ point warrants a 
re-examination of the evidence that ostensibly substantiates the remapping hypothesis. 
The remapping hypothesis, in large part, depends upon evidence of cortical co-
activation (i.e., the stimulation of a deafferented cortex by way of afferent signals 
overflowing from a neighboring intact cortex). Traditionally, cortical co-activation has 
been understood to indicate dramatic cortical reorganization, but it is critical to point out 
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that we do not literally see cortical re-organization in neural scans. Neural scans indicate 
where in the brain cortical activity is occurring, but do not show structural changes. 
In amputees, scans show activity in a deafferented cortex when there is activity in a 
neighboring intact cortex. Ramachandran takes this co-activation to indicate that an 
intact cortex has initiated an invasion of a deafferented cortex, such that the deafferented 
cortex is being reorganized and will become continuous with the intact cortex. But 
certainly, this cannot be the only possible explanation of cortical co-activation. It’s 
possible that the co-activation of a deafferented and intact cortex has no significant effect 
at all. It is also possible that the co-activation of a deafferented and intact cortex serves to 
preserve the structure and functional capacities of the deafferented cortex. 
Without afferent stimuli a cortex will degenerate, but the observed phenomenon of 
cortical co-activation indicates a way in which a cortex could continue to receive necessary 
afferent stimulation and avoid degeneration post-deafferentation. However, it is unclear 
if the origin of afferent signals affect the effects these signals can have on a deafferented 
area. That is, must the afferent stimuli arriving at a cortex originate from that cortex’s 
corresponding limb to contribute to its preservation? If the answer is yes, then it seems 
doubtful that the effect of cortical co-activation is the preservation of a deafferented 
cortex. But if the answer is no, that afferent signals can stimulate a cortex regardless of 
their location of origin, then the afferent stimuli of diverse origins could very well serve 
to preserve the structure and functional capacities of a deafferented cortex. 
Fortunately, progress has been made in answering the above question. In an 
extensive review of the phantom limb literature, Giummarra et al. argue that afferent 
stimuli continue to arrive at a deafferented limb from a variety of sources and that 
this continued afferent stimuli has the effect of preserving the neural structure of the 
deafferented area, giving rise to a “normal (non-painful)” phantom limb (Giummarra et 
al. 2007, 228). A deafferented cortex’s sources of afferent stimulation include: (1) “the 
residual limb and stump;” (2) sensations arriving from the intact contralateral limb via 
“cross-callosal pathways; (3) “activation of mirror neurons” from watching others move 
their intact limbs; and, (4) visual feedback from the use of a prosthetic (Ibid, 224; 226; 
225; 223). Giummarra et al. argue that the arrival of afferent stimuli from these diverse 
sources counteract cortical reorganization initiated by neighboring intact cortices.11 Thus, 
11. This position is also echoed by Lotze et al, who argue that “frequent and extensive use of a myoelectric 
prosthesis is correlated negatively with cortical reorganization and phantom limb pain and positively 
with the reduction in phantom limb pain over time. This suggests that the ongoing stimulation, muscular 
training of the stump and visual feedback from the prosthesis might have a beneficial effect on both 
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afferent stimuli arriving at a deafferented cortex can aid in preserving the structure and 
functional capacities of that cortex despite not originating from the peripheral limb to 
which the cortex corresponds. 
Now, if afferent signals coming from other sources have the effect of stabilizing the 
structure and functional capacities of a deafferented cortex, why must afferent signals 
originating in neighboring intact cortices destabilize the structure of a deafferented 
cortex, as suggested by the remapping hypothesis? It is certainly possible that 
Ramachandran is correct, that afferent signals from an intact cortex have the effect of 
reorganizing a deafferented cortex, but such a position requires further explanation; 
we must know what accounts for the different effects had by afferent stimuli in a 
deafferented cortex. 
There is, of course, the possibility that afferent stimuli arriving from intact 
cortices serve to preserve a neighboring deafferented cortex. And, in fact, the findings 
of Giummarra et al. substantiate the view that cortical co-activation constitutes a 
mechanism by which the structure and functional capacities of a deafferented cortex 
are preserved long-term. I call this alternative account of cortical co-activation the 
“preservation hypothesis,” and I summarize it as follows: 
1. Upon deafferentation, the brain’s normal mode of operation is 
maintained, and the effect is the preservation of the structure and 
functional capacities of the deafferented area.
2. Preservation is accomplished by an overflow of afferent signals 
from intact cortical areas arriving at and stimulating the 
deafferented area.
3. The arrival of these afferent signals is made possible by pre-existing 
neural connections that exist between the deafferented area and 
many other cortical areas.
4. The flow of afferent signals does not represent a significant change 
in cortical organization or operation, but reveals the normal 
functioning and communication between brain regions.12 
cortical reorganization and phantom limb pain” (Lotze et al. 1999, 502). 
12. Afferent signals normally overflow into other cortical areas, but usually are inhibited by afferent signals 
coming from intact peripheral limbs (Ramachandran 1998, 34).
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The preservation hypothesis proposes that no significant cortical reorganization 
occurs in a cortical area following deafferentation. Rather, the brain’s structures and 
modes of operation facilitate the stimulation of a deafferented area with afferent stimuli 
from intact cortical areas, the effect of which is that the deafferented area receives stimuli 
aiding it in preserving its overall structure and functional capacities. In this view, a cortical 
area would have many pre-existing neural connections between itself and a variety of 
other cortices, receiving continuous afferent stimulation. Under normal operating 
conditions, these neural signals are inhibited by afferent signals arriving directly from the 
peripheral body. When the arrival of afferent signals directly from the peripheral body 
desists following deafferentation, afferent signals coming from other cortices – signals 
that have been arriving the entire time but until this point have failed to excite the intact 
cortical area – now successfully excite the deafferented area. The arrival of these afferent 
signals serve to stimulate the deafferented cortex with the effect of preserving the 
deafferented cortex’s structure and functional capacities. This is not to say that afferent 
signals coming from other cortical areas are sufficient for maintaining the structure and 
functional capacities of the deafferented cortex, but that this is the end that the afferent 
signals serve. 
Note that the preservation hypothesis utilizes a great deal of Ramachandran’s initial 
insights regarding phantom sensations and the effects of deafferentation. The point of 
disagreement concerns the effect of overflow afferent signals on a deafferented cortex. 
Ramachandran maintains that the effect of overflow afferent signals is the restructuring 
of a deafferented area, such that its structure becomes continuous with a neighboring 
intact cortical area. The preservation hypothesis proposes that overflow afferent stimuli 
contribute to the structural and functional preservation of a deafferented cortex.
In contrast to the remapping hypothesis, the preservation hypothesis maintains that 
a primary function of the brain is the preservation of the brain’s structures and functional 
capacities, even if this conflicts with accurately representing the condition of the 
body. Following deafferentation, the brain engages in no activity that would eliminate 
phantom sensations. On the contrary, activities in the brain would work to preserve the 
neural structures giving rise to phantom sensations, thus maintaining the structures and 
functional capacities of the brain regardless of whether the consequence is an inaccurate 
experience of the body.
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V. Remapping vs. Preservation: An Empirical Comparison
The preservation hypothesis proposes that cortical co-activation alerts us to 
a mechanism by which the brain continues to supply a deafferented cortex with 
afferent stimulation, contributing to that cortex’s long-term structural and functional 
preservation. This is in direct opposition to the remapping hypothesis, which proposes 
that the mechanism indicative of cortical co-activation simultaneously serves to 
deconstruct a deafferented cortex and reorganize it to be continuous with the structure 
and functional capacities of a neighboring intact cortex. Aside from the fact that afferent 
stimulation can arrive at a deafferented cortex from numerous other cortical areas with 
the effect of contributing to the long-term preservation of the deafferented cortex, is 
there any other empirical evidence that could support the preservation hypothesis? 
Indeed, there is. 
A serious challenge facing the remapping hypothesis is the need to explain certain 
discrepancies between the entailments of the remapping hypothesis and the phenomenal 
experiences of amputees with phantom sensations. For instance, the remapping 
hypothesis posits that the cortical reorganization that follows deafferentation dismantles 
the neural structure that gives rise to phantom sensations, resulting in a significant 
reduction in the vividness of phantom sensations and, ultimately, the complete 
disappearance of phantom sensations. Conversely, we ought to expect an increase in the 
sensitivity and/or functional capacity of intact cortices that now have a greater area of 
representation in the brain.
Unfortunately for the remapping hypothesis, this progressive elimination of 
phantom sensations is just not experienced among amputees with phantom limbs. 
Amputees typically experience their phantom limbs long-term, without any decrease 
in the vividness of the phantom. A study by Lotze et al. on the effects of myoelectric 
prosthetics of the somatosensory cortex includes a patient who continues to experience 
phantom sensations 53 years after amputation (Lotze et al. 1999). Another study by 
Makin et al. includes a patient who continues to experience phantom sensations 47 
years post-amputation, with the average post-amputation time of all 18 of their subjects 
being 18 years (Makin et al. 2012). And even after extended periods of time following 
amputation, amputees not only continue to feel their phantoms but can execute fine 
motor skills, such as the opening and closing of their phantom fists and “thumb to index 
opposition” (Raffin, E. et al. 2012, 748). Additionally, Ramachandran proposes that 
we ought to see functional enhancements associated with body parts whose area of 
representation has expanded into a deafferented area (Ramachandran 2000, 319). While 
more research may have to be conducted on this front, currently, no major research study 
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has found a noticeable increase in the functional capacity of intact body parts following 
deafferentation. 
Phantom sensations do not disappear over time, do not decrease in vividness, and 
amputees tend to maintain motor control and the ability to execute fine motor skills even 
five decades, or more, after amputation. These experiences of phantom sensations do 
not sound like the perceptual correlates of dramatic cortical restructuring. Rather, these 
perceptual correlates appear perfectly consistent with continued structural and functional 
preservation of a deafferented cortex. 
For Giummarra et al., the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that a deafferented 
cortex continues to receive afferent signals from diverse sources in the brain, and that the 
arrival of these afferent signals support the continued preservation of the deafferented 
cortex. However, Giummarra does not dispute the arguments that cortical co-
activation points to “rapid cortical reorganization contralateral to the deafferented limb” 
(Giummarra et al. 2007, 227). The picture painted by Giummarra et al. is one of a brain 
divided. On the one hand, deafferentation initiates a process of neural restructuring, 
such that an intact cortex invades a neighboring deafferented area, utilizing pre-existing 
neural connections to expand its area of representation in the brain. On the other hand, 
a deafferented cortex continues to receive stimulation from diverse neural sources, with 
the effect of preserving some of its neural structure and functional capacities. The result is 
that the somatosensory cortex is subject to two simultaneous, yet contrary, mechanisms; 
one which erodes the structure of a deafferented cortex and another that preserves it. 
As Ramachandran, Giummarra et al. maintain that a primary function of the brain is the 
accurate representation of the body, but simultaneously suggest that the very structure 
and normal functioning of the brain itself stands in the way of the brain fulfilling that 
function. 
Not all researchers, however, take cortical reorganization as a given. Tamar Makin, for 
instance, argues that dramatic cortical reorganization is not the effect of deafferentation, 
and that the evidence in support of it “is largely based on…crude measurements” (Makin 
et al. 2015, 2140). To remedy the often “crude” and inconsistent measurements of cortical 
co-activation, 
…we assessed remapping of sensorimotor lip representations using 
an unfolded model of the cortex, allowing us to measure surface-
based cortical distances while considering individual cortical folding 
patterns (Maeda et al., 2014) in 17 unilateral upper limb amputees 
and 21 intact controls. We found consistent shifts in lip representation 
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along the homunculus contralateral to the missing hand in amputees 
(hereafter ‘deprived homunculus’) towards the hand area. However, 
this shift didn’t reflect full invasion of the lips into the hand territory 
as previously described, but rather a small local shift in the centre of 
gravity of the lips (Makin et al. 2015, 2141).
Using an “unfolded model of the cortex,” Makin et al. determine that there is a shift 
in contralateral intact lip representation in unilateral hand amputees, but that this shift is 
much smaller than previously documented and does not constitute a “full invasion of the 
lips into” the deafferented cortex. Measured “shifts in lip representation” were consistent 
among unilateral hand amputees, but so slight that Makin et al. could not establish 
“any statistical relationship between cortical reorganization and phantom sensations” 
(Makin et al. 2015, 2145). Makin et al.’s findings, while they certainly require further 
corroboration, open the possibility that cortical co-activation may not be as dramatic as 
previously thought. And, while Makin et al. do not posit why shifts in lip representation 
are observed, it is possible that these consistent, yet slight, shifts of lip representation 
toward the deafferented cortex are the effect of overflow afferent signals from the lip 
area successfully reaching and exciting the deafferented hand cortex by way of new or 
pre-existing neural connections, as suggested by the preservation hypothesis. 
In addition to raising concerns over the extent of cortical reorganization/co-activation 
that is being reported in phantom limb studies, Makin is one of a handful of researchers 
spearheading a new approach in the way that phantom sensations are studied. As 
mentioned above, phantom sensation research has historically been challenging because 
its subject concerns a non-existing limb; the study lacks a peripheral limb at which to 
focus its inquiry. When Pons discovered that touching an intact body part could excite 
activity in a deafferented cortex, the field of phantom limb research exploded; finally, 
researchers could utilize the intact peripheral body as a means of studying sensations 
corresponding to a non-existent limb. In recent years, a new revolution in the study of 
phantom limb research has begun through the identification of an alternative medium 
by which to study phantom sensations. This medium; the movement of a phantom limb. 
In their research, Karen T. Reilly and Estelle Raffin have sought to determine whether 
executive movements of a phantom limb are purely imaginary or resemble the executive 
movements of intact limbs. Reilly et al. and Raffin et al. measured EMG activity in the 
stumps of unilateral hand amputees and two-handed subjects both when they moved 
their phantom limbs and when they were asked to imagine moving their phantom limbs 
(Reilly et al. 2006; Raffin et al. 2012). No significant activity was recorded for either 
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amputees or two-handed subjects when asked to imagine moving their limbs. However, 
both Reilly et al. and Raffin et al. observed “significant movement-related bursts of EMG 
activity in stump muscles” when unilateral hand amputees completed executive motions 
with their phantom limb (Raffin et al. 2012, 753). Additionally, amputees “insist” that 
imagined movements of their phantom limbs feel like imagined movements of other 
intact body parts, whereas “motor execution with the phantom evokes sensations close 
to those experienced when they actually move a body part” (Raffin et al, 754-5). Raffin et 
al. conclude that “amputees moved their phantom limb during our execution condition 
and imagined moving it during our imagination condition” (Raffin et al, 753).
The possibility of observing the effects of deafferentation in the brain by way of 
patients “moving” their phantom limbs is being pursued further by Tamar Makin. Using 
18 unilateral upper-limb amputees with an average of 18 years since amputation and “22 
intact controls (two handers),” Makin et al. conducted a series of fMRI scans to determine 
neural activity that corresponded exclusively to the movement of a phantom limb (Makin 
et al. 2012, 2). Makin et al. found that “group activation for phantom movements 
was similar to that found during two-handers’ non-dominant hand movements in the 
primary sensorimotor cortex…suggesting preserved functional representations” (Makin 
et al. 2012, 2-3). Prior to Makin et al.’s research, we have never observed neural activity 
isolated to the deafferented cortex; we could only estimate the effects of deafferentation 
by way of the phenomenon of cortical co-activation. Makin et al.’s focus on phantom 
movements themselves, has finally provided a means to isolate neural activity in the 
deafferented cortex, and the findings are such that there is a great degree of preservation 
of the cortex’s original area of representation.
Makin et al.’s findings certainly prove problematic for the remapping hypothesis. 
If cortical co-activation directly corresponded with cortical reorganization, then neural 
activity in the deafferented cortex ought to be significantly reduced in size compared to 
the size of the cortical territory prior to deafferentation. However, that’s just not what 
we see; when we observe neural activity isolated to the deafferented cortex, we observe 
preservation of cortical structure. Now perhaps something like what Giummarra et al. 
have suggested is occurring, that is, following deafferentation, there are two mechanisms 
at work simultaneously, one which deconstructs a deafferented cortex and another that 
preserves the structure of a deafferented cortex. This may very well be the case, and if it 
were true could partially vindicate the remapping hypothesis. Something like remapping 
may be occurring, it just would take much longer to obtain because of counteracting 
forces. But, at the very least, the remapping hypothesis and researchers must concede a 
critical piece of evidence on which the remapping hypothesis rests; cortical co-activation 
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does not directly correspond to cortical reorganization. The remapping hypothesis takes 
cortical co-activation to be identical with cortical reorganization, such that cortical co-
activation indicates the new boundaries of an intact cortical area and the extent to 
which it has invaded a deafferented cortex. However, if neural activity isolated to the 
deafferented cortex shows a preservation of the original neural structure, then clearly 
cortical co-activation does not align with cortical reorganization. 
Makin et al.’s findings could also be indicative of another possibility, that something 
like what the preservation hypothesis proposes is at work following deafferentation. 
Note that the preservation hypothesis argues that cortical co-activation is not indicative 
of cortical reorganization but reveals intercortical transference of afferent stimuli with 
the effect of preserving the structure and functional capacities of a deafferented area. 
Thereby, if we were ever able to observe the isolated activity of a deafferented cortex, we 
ought to see a great degree of structural preservation. And that, in fact, is exactly what 
we observe, now that Makin et al. have pioneered a means to isolate the neural activity 
of a deafferented cortex. 
VI. Concluding Remarks
My intent in writing this piece is not to indisputably prove the preservation 
hypothesis or debunk the remapping hypothesis. What I want to show is that there 
is sufficient evidence to suggest that something like the preservation hypothesis could 
explain research findings on the effects of deafferentation in the somatosensory cortex. 
And, if this is the case, then additional research ought to pursued that explores the 
possibility of neural preservation following deafferentation.
Whether remapping or the preservation of a cortex follows deafferentation is of 
material consequence to the determination of how best to treat phantom limb pain. 
Researchers and clinicians who take remapping seriously, tend to approach the medical 
treatment of phantom pain in terms of (1) expediting cortical reorganization, and/or 
(2) the pharmaceutical management of pain.13 The preservation hypothesis conceives of 
the health of the brain in terms of its ability to preserve all its constituent structures and 
functional capacities, suggesting that treatments for phantom pain ought to be directed 
towards accomplishing that end. 
13. Medications currently used to treat phantom pain include “opioids, NMDA receptor antagonists, 
anticonvulsants, antidepressants, calcitonins, and anaesthetics,” with researchers finding these 
pharmaceutical interventions “unsatisfactory” in managing phantom pain long-term (Alviar et al. 2011, 2).
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Additionally, phantom sensation research provides critical insights for conceiving a 
primary function of the brain: does the functioning of the brain produce an accurate 
representation of the body or preserve the structures and functional capacities of 
the brain/body? The phenomenon of phantom sensation pits these two accounts of 
brain function against one another. Eliminating phantom sensations and restoring 
the alignment between the experience and actual condition of the body requires the 
destruction of the neural structures that underpin the appearance of a phantom limb. 
Thereby, the process of ensuring the accurate representation of the body would come at 
the cost of the preservation of the brain’s structures and functional capacities. In contrast, 
the brain’s operating to preserve its neural structures and functional capacities, the very 
neural structures that give rise to phantom sensations, would result in the continued 
discordance between the experience and actual condition of the body. Given that the 
requirements for accurate representation and preservation each entail a condition 
that would prevent the other from obtaining, it would be impossible for the brain to 
simultaneously pursue both these ends. If the brain’s function is to preserve itself, one’s 
experience of the body will be in permanent discord with the actual condition of the 
body. And if the brain’s function is to accurately represent the body, it must engage in 
self-destruction, eliminating the neural structures of the phantom limb to restore the 
alignment between our experience of the body and the body’s actual condition. 
It is important to note that these philosophical musings over the function of the 
brain are very much of practical significance. As Socrates points out in the Phaedrus, 
if we want to make the body “healthy and strong” on “the basis of an art,” then it is 
necessary “to determine the nature of…the body” (Plato Phaedrus, 270b3-7). In the case 
of neuroscience, we must extend Socrates’ insights to include the brain as well, such 
that, in pursuing an understanding of the nature of the brain, we simultaneously pursue 
an understanding of what truly constitutes a healthy and strong brain. Thus, I do hope 
that my work here encourages future research projects on phantom sensations. But even 
more so, I hope that this piece inspires researchers, in all areas of neuroscience, to reflect 
upon their conceptual commitments concerning the ultimate function of the brain, and 
to consider how these commitments affect their research and approach to the treatment 
of neurological conditions. 
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